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1 Introduction
This short note provides some additional insight into how the HARP program works. In some
cases, it is possible for HARP to trim away too many states and obtain an optimistic result. The
HARP Version 7.0 manual[I] warns the user that "Unlike the ALL model, the SAME model can
automaticMly drop failure modes for certain system models. The user is cautioned to insure that
no important failure modes are dropped; otherwise, a non-conservative result can be given". This
note illustrates how this can occur and gives a pointer to further documentation that furnishes a
means of bounding the error associated with trimming. This note provides a theoretical discussion
of trimming, but does not provide testing results for HARP.
2 Overview of the Harp Program
2.1 Reliability Modeling: Background
Markov modeling provides a means for calculating the reliability of a fault-tolerant computer system
when given values for its parameters. In the Markov modeling approach, a system is represented
by a vector of attributes that change over time. A particular set of values of the attributes is called
a "state" of the system. These attributes are typically system characteristics such as the number
of working processors, the number of spare units, the number of faulty units that have not been
removed, etc. The more attributes included in the model, the more complex the model will be.
Thus, one typically tries to choose the smallest set of attributes that can accurately describe the
fault-related behavior of the system. An important goal in reliability modeling is to ignore aspects
of the system that are unimportant (i.e. do not affect the reliability) and to include aspects that
are important. This is accomplished by letting each state in the reliability model represent many
different states in the actual system.
Certain states in the system represent system failure, while others represent fault-free behavior
or correct operation in the presence of faults. To adequately estimate reliability, the model chosen
for the system must represent system failure properly. Defining exactly what constitutes system
failure is difficult because system failure is often an extremely complex function of external events,
software state, and hardware state. The next step in the modeling process is to characterize the
transition time from one state to another. Since this transition time is rarely deterministic, the
transition times are described using a probability distribution.
Typically, the transitions of a fault-tolerant system model fall into two categories: slow failure
transitions and fast recovery transitions. If the states of the model are defined properly, then the
slow transitions can be obtained from field data and/or MIL-STD 217C calculations. The faster
transition rates correspond to system responses to fault arrivals and can be measured experimentally
using fault injection.
The simplest architecture to model is a single computer. To model this, let T be a random
variable representing the time to failure of the computer. Next, we must define a distribution for
T, say F(t). Typically, it is assumed that electronic components, and consequently computers, fail
according to the exponential distribution:
F(t) = Prob[T < t] = 1 - e-at
The parameter )_ completely defines this distribution.
The Triple-Modular Redundant (TMR) is one of the simplest fault-tolerant computer architec-
tures. The system consists of three computers all performing exactly the same computations on
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exactly the same inputs. The computers are assumed to be physically isolated such that a failed
computer cannot affect another working computer. MathematicMly, therefore, the computers are
assumed to fail independently. It is further assumed that the outputs are voted prior to being used
by the external system (not included in this model), and thus a single failure does not propagate
its erroneous value to the external world. Thus, system failure does not occur until two computers
fail. The model of Figure 1 describes such a system. State 1 represents the initial condition of
Figure 1: Model of a TMR System
three working computers. The transition from state i to state 2 is labeled 3A to represent the rate
at which any one of the three computers fail. Since all of the computers are identical, the failure
rate is the same for each computer, A. The rate at which any of the three computers fail is 3A.
The system is in state 2 when one processor has failed. The transition fl'om state 2 to state 3 has
rate 2A since there are only two working computers that can fail. State 3 represents system failure
because a majority of the computers in the system have failed.
Now, consider a reconfigurable quadraplex. Such a system starts with 4 processors then degrades
to a triplex then to a duplex and then to a simplex in response to processor failures. The system
fails if two near-coincident faults occur (i.e. a second fault arrives before the system can recover
from the first fault) or if all of the processors fail before the end of a specified mission time. The
probability of failure of this system can be computed using the Markov model in Figure 2. The
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Figure 2: Model of a Degradable Quad
transition from state 1 to state 2 represents failure of one of the four processors in the quad. The
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near-coincident faults that could lead to system failure from state 2 would be failures of either of
the other three processors in the quad. Thus, the near-coincident fault rate is 3A. The transition
from state 2 to state 4 represents system recovery, which degrades the system to a triplex, and is
labelled with F,. The notation Fr represents the distribution of the recovery time. The transition
from state 4 to state 5 represents failure of a processor in the newly formed triad. If either of the
other two good processors fail before the system reconfigures then the system fails. Thus, the near-
coincident failure rate at this state would be 2A. The transition from state 5 to state 7 represents
system recovery, which degrades the system to a duplex. The rest of the model is developed using
similar logic.
2.2 Introduction to HARP User-Interface
The HARP FORM/FEHM approach to model specification is briefly described in this section.
In many reliability analysis programs, the model in Figure 2 would be entered as a single entity
by delineating each transition in the model. The HARP program uses a different approach to
describe a model predicated upon analyzing the slow fault-arrival behavior of the system and the
fast fault-recovery behavior separately. To input a model, the HARP user creates three separate
items: a Fault-Occurrence/Repair Model (FORM), a Fault/Error-Handling Model (FEHM) and an
"Interfering Components Specification" (ICS). Conceptually, HARP calculates the probability of
system failure, Psys, from these three user inputs. The user-supplied FORM defines the sequence
of events that leads to system failure by exhaustion of parts given that all recovery processes are in-
stantaneous and perfect. This can be input directly by the user or generated by the HARP program
from a fault-tree description of the fault-occurrence behavior. For the degradable quadraplex mod-
eled in Figure 2, the HARP FORM is given in Figure 3. The FORM describes all of the sequences
Figure 3: HARP FORM For a Degradable Quadraplex
of failures that can lead to system failure. In a FORM it is assumed that all reconfigurations take
place perfectly and instantanously. Consequently there are no reconfiguration or near-coincident
failure transitions in a FORM.
Next, the HARP user defines a FEHM that describes the recovery process for each fault type.
In the case of the quadraplex in Figure 2, there is only one fault type so there is only one FEHM
model. However, it is used in severM places. The FEHM corresponds to the transitions labelled
FT. in Figure 2. HARP allows the user to describe the recovery process in a variety of ways. One
of the simplest methods is the "Moments" option. Here, the user supplies the first three moments
of Ft. The following are alternative Fault/Error-Handling Models supported by HARP: Values,
Probabilities and Distributions, Probabilities and EmpiricM Data, ARIES, CARE III, and ESPN.
For every type of FEttM there are three exit transitions labelled T,R, and S corresponding to
transient-fault recovery, permanent fault-recovery and single-point failure, respectively. This is
illustrated in Figure 4. In many examples, the Moments option is used with the T and S transition
probabilities set to zero. In this case the FEHM reduces to a single exponentially distributed
transition with a mean transition time of # (or rate 5 equal to 1/#.) There is one FEHM for each
possible fault type in the FORM.
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Figure 4: FEHM Exit Transitions And Simple Example
After defining system recovery, the user is asked to identify the interacting components. This
is done by specifying one of the following options for ICS: ALL, SAME, or USER-DEFINED.
From this information, the HARP program must determine the probability of entering the near-
coincident-failure death states. That is, the HARP program must effectively deduce all of the
information that is contained in Figure 2 from the three separate inputs: FORM, FEHM, and ICS.
The HARP program merges the FORM and FEHMs into a single model internally to cMculate
the probability of system failure. The first step of the merging process is illustrated in Figure 5.
The set of faults that coincidently fail the system must be inferred from the FORM and the ICS
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Figure 5: First Step Of FORM/FEHM Merging Process
specification since this information is not directly input by the user. HARP calculates the near-
coincident failure rate for a given transition by an algorithm that examines the failure transitions of
the previous and next states. The algorithm is different depending upon whether the user specifies
the ICS input to be ALL, SAME, or USER. The ICS=ALL case is illustrated in Figure 6.
3 The HARP Trimming Method
Whenever there is only one component in the system, there is no difference between ICS=SAME
and ICS=ALL. Thus, the simplest system one can use to illustrate FORM/FEHM merging for
ICS=SAME is a system with two components. Consider a system that consists of two subsystems
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Figure 6: Second Step Of FORM/FEHM Merging Process
each of which consists of a triplex that degrades to a simplex. Each subsystem consists of a set
of replicated processors of one component type. Although each processor within a subsystem is
identical, the processors in one subsystem can be given a different failure rate than the processors
in the other subsystem. Let A1 represent the failure rate of the processors in subsystem 1 and A2
the failure rate of the processors in subsystem 2. The FORM for this system is illustrated in Figure
7. For simplicity suppose that the FEHM for each subsystem does not have a single-point failure
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Figure 7: FORM for a Two Triplex-to-Simplex System
or transient-fault exit. Therefore, using the Moments FEHM option we need only specify the first
three moments of the permanent fault recovery process. For simplicity, assume that each recovery
is exponential with rate 51 for subsystem 1 and rate 52 for subsystem 2.
Before illustrating how the HARP FORM/FEHM merging technique works, consider what a
complete model of this system would contain. In Figure 8 each of the states has been labelled with
four numbers representing four attributes of the system (NWl,NF1,NW2,NF2):
5
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Figure 8: Complete Model of System Consisting of Two Tri_d-to-Simplex Subsystems
6
NWI:
NFI:
NW2:
NF2:
Numberof workingprocessorsin subsystem1
Numberof faulty processorsin subsystem1
Numberof workingprocessorsin subsystem2
Numberof faulty processorsin subsystem2
The systemstarts in state(3030).This meansthat eachsubsystemhas3 workingprocessorsand
no faulty processors.If a processorin subsystem1 fails, the systemtransitionsto state(2130).If
a processorin subsystem2 fails, thesystemtransitionsto state(3021).Whilein state(2130),the
systemistrying to reconfigure.If it reconfiguresbeforea secondprocessorin subsystem1fails,the
systemtransitionsto state(1030),i.e. thefirst subsystemis a simplexandthe secondsubsystemis
still a triplex. If a secondprocessorin subsystem1failsbeforeit reconfigures,then thesystemfails
in deathstate(1230).Notethat therearetwo simultaneousfaults in subsystem1in this situation.
If a secondprocessorin the other subsystemfailsbeforereconfigurationis completed,then the
systemgoesto state (2121).In state(2121)both triadshavea singlefaulty processor.Sincethe
triadsareindependent,this doesnot representsystemfailure. Fromthis state,fourpossibleevents
canhappennext:
1) a secondprocessorin subsystem1fails causingsystemfailure,
2) a secondprocessorin subsystem2 fails causingsystemfailure,
3) subsystem1reconfiguresby degradingto a simplex,or
4) subsystem2 reconfiguresby degradingto a simplex.
Thetwo reconfigurationtransitionstakeyou to states(1021)and (2110),respectively.Note that
in state(2121)thereare twocompetingrecoveries.
The result of the FORM-FEHMmergingprocessis illustrated in Figures9 and 10. In the
ICS=ALL case,the systemstate (2121)is madea deathstate (seefigure 9). Notethat this is a
conservativemodel.In fact it canbeaveryconservativemodelbecauseit ignoresthefault isolation
regionsassociatedwith eachsubsystem.
-:k.¸ i '!_,-,_:,_"_;_ , • , .... . i• •_•" , ::•/
A A1 :C2
_ _"_ 1
2A
_2
3A2
C
Figure 9: Merged FORM/FEHM for a Two Triplex-to-Simplex System (ICS=ALL)
In the ICS=SAME case (see figure 10), state (2121) and its descendents (1221) and (2112) are
trimmed away. This is an optimistic model, since some failure modes are ignored, i.e. states (1221)
Figure 10: Merged FORM/FEHM for a Two Triplex-to-Simplex System (ICS=SAME)
and (2112) are not included in the computed probability of system failure. Usually these states
contribute a very insignificant amount of probability in comparison to other states in the model, e.g.,
state (1230). This can be seen by noting that there are only two component failures leading to the
death state (1230) whereas states (1221) and (2112) occur after 3 component failures. Thus, they
are typically severM orders of magnitude smaller than the dominant failure states in the model.
However, the HARP program does not calculate any error bound on the amount of probability
that is being ignored. Thus, the FORM/FEIIM merging technique for ICS=SAME relies on a
heuristic solution. This heuristic solution can be very good and can be used successfully if one can
determine that the amount trimmed away is insignificant. A bound has been developed by Dr.
Allan White[2, 3], but it is not implemented in HARP. However, the user of HARP can manually
calculate this bound to determine if too much has been trimmed away by the FORM/FEHM
merging process.
Since the ICS=SAME method ignores some failure modes, the question arises whether it can
serve as a lower bound on the system probability of failure. However, since HARP uses both
conservative approximations (e.g., instantaneous jump) and non-conservative approximations (e.g.,
trimming of certainfailuremodes)whencomputingits result,onecannotdeterminewhetherthe
answeris conservativeor optimistic. To illustrate theproblem,supposein calculatingx, one first
uses a non-conservative approximation y: x > y. Then, one uses a conservative approximation z
for y: y < z. The true relationship of z to x is not determinable. This is precisely the situation
when one uses ICS=SAME.
4 Example of Non-Conservative Trimming
As shown in section 2, the HARP FORM/FEHM merging technique trims away some transitions
from the model when the user specifies ICS=SAME. In this section some examples are constructed
to demonstrate the effect of trimming states.
Consider a system of N triads that functions much like FTMP. If a processor in a triad fails
and spares are available, the system repairs the triad with a spare. If no spares are available, the
system removes the faulty triad from the configuration and adds the good processors to the spares
pool. System failure occurs if a triad has two faulty processors (i.e. a second processor fails before
it can be repMred or removed from the system) or if there are not enough triads remaining to run
the workload (i.e. exhaustion of parts). The system has difficulty diagnosing which processors are
faulty when more than one triad has a faulty processor. Therefore, in this situation the system
does not reconfigure. 1 For simplicity, it is assumed that the system never misdiagnoses a faulty
processor and knows when it has more than one triad with a faulty processor. Two parameters of
this system are relevant:
NI = number of triads in the initial configuration
MNT = minimum number triads needed to execute the workload
Several (NI,MNT) system configurations are presented for which ICS=SAME yields non-conservative
results. However, to facilitate the discussion, a configuration where the ICS=SAME result is ac-
ceptable is presented first.
4.0.1 Configuration Where ICS--SAME Produces Negligible Error
Consider a (2,1) configuration. The complete model is shown in Figure 11. Initially the system
has two good triads and no spares. Thus, the first transition is from state (3) _ (4) with rate
6A. After the system is in state (4) several things can happen. Another processor in the same triad
could fail causing system failure (i.e. we enter state (1)). This is a near-coincident failure that
occurs at rate 2A. Alternatively, the system could recover from the first fault taking us to state (6).
One option remains--a processor could fail in the other triad. This takes us to state (5) and occurs
at rate 3A. This is the transition that would be implicitly omitted by HARP if the user specifies
ICS=SAME. The rest of the model is clear if one keeps in mind that the two good processors of
the removed triad are made spares. Thus, the recovery transitions from (7) _ (8) and (9) --+
(10) replace a faulty processor with a spare. While not being used, the failure rate of the spares
are assumed to be zero to simplify the model. The ICS=SAME model is shown in Figure 12.
The ICS=SAME model differs from the full model in that there are no failure transitions from
a recovery state that do not end in a death state. This is true in general for HARP. When one
sets ICS=ALL, all failure transitions end in the death state, so there are no transitions omitted in
this case. When one sets ICS=SAME they are implicitly omitted from the model. In the model of
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Figure 11: Two Triads--Full Model
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Figure 12: Two Triads--ICS=SAME Model
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Model
Parameters: A ----]0-4 perhour
-- 104perhour
Time = 10 3 hours
Pf estimated by PAWS
Full Model (Figure 1) 2.03968 x 10 -5
ICS=Same Model (Figure 2) 2.03942 x 10 -5
Table 1: Pf at 1000 Hours for (2,1) Configuration
Figure 12 the transition from (4) _ (5) has been omitted.
The probability of system failure after 1000 hours is given in Table 1. For this system, the error
is clearly negligible, but in the non-conservative direction.
It should be noted that these computations were not performed using HARP, because HARP
performs an additional approximation (based on behavioral decomposition) after trimming, which
would greatly complicate the illustration here. See section 5 for an overview of this technique and
a discussion of how this additional approximation may mask the error due to trimming in some
cases.
4.0.2 Configuration Where ICS--SAME is Non-Conservative
The non-conservatism of the ICS=SAME model becomes increasingly more significant as NI is
increased. Consider a system with 10 triads. A portion of the 175-state (10,1) model is shown in
Figure 13.
As before, the ICS=SAME model does not have any failure transitions exiting from a recovery
state that do not end in a failure state; e.g., transitions (4) ----. (5) and (8) ----+ (10) are omitted.
The results for a (10,1) configuration are shown in Table 2.
Model
Parameters: = 10-4 per hour
5 = 104 per hour
Time = 10 3 hours
Pf estimated by PAWS
Full Model (Figure 3) 2.15 x 10 -7
ICS=Same Model 5.53 × 10 -8
Table 2: Pf at 1000 Hours for (10,1) Configuration
Thus, for this model, the ICS=SAME truncation method yields a result that is significantly
non-conservative (i.e. the exact value is four times larger than the ICS=SAME value). The non-
conservatism grows as the mission time is increased. The results for a 2000 hour mission are given
in Table 3.
The error resulting from the ICS=SAME truncation method can be shown to be negligible
for many systems. Thus, the HARP ICS=SAME technique can be used successfully if there is
1FTMP often had difficulty isolating the faults in such situations. However, FTMP, unlike this system, did
reconfigure in this situation.
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Figure 13: Ten Triads--Part of the Model
Model
Parameters: /_ = 10-4 per hour
5 = 104 per hour
Time = 2 x 10 3 hours
Full Model (Figure 3)
ICS=Same Model
Pf estimated by PAWS
6.62 x 10 .7
1.05 x 10 -7
Table 3: Pf at 2000 Hours for (10,1) Configuration
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assurancethat theprobabilitycontributionfrom M1of theomittedtransitionsis insignificant.This
canbeaccomplishedby performingsomeadditionalhandcalculations[3,2]. 2 However,oneshould
beawarethat ICS=SAMEcanleadto non-conservativeresults.TheHARPprogramdoesnot warn
the userwhenthe omittedtransitionsaresignificant.Thus, without some additional analysis, one
does not know when the ICS=SAME technique is non-conservative.
4.0.3 The HARP input
The model shown in Figure 13 can be converted into a HARP "FORM model" by removing all of
the recovery states and the transitions emanating from them. This is illustrated in Figure 14.
Figure 14: HARP FORM for Ten Triads (ICS=ALL)
Although this FORM could be used in an ICS=ALL analysis, it cannot be used if one wishes
to specify ICS-SAME. In order for HARP to determine the interfering failure rate, each triad
must be given a unique name and symbofic failure rate. Thus, there would be 10 symbolic rates:
A1,A2, A3,...A10. The FORM would have 10 failure transitions from the start state, each with
failure rate Ai. Part of this FORM is shown in Figure 15.
(_ 3A1 =if
3A2 k,
)_ * . . .
3A2
3A10
Figure 15: HARP FORM for Ten Triads (ICS=SAME)
5 HARP Solution Method--Behavioral DecompositionXFG
The HARP program solves the merged FORM/FEHM model using the technique of behavioral
decomposition. A brief overview is given here. The basic idea of behavioral decomposition is to
2For small systems the number of transitions that are omitted is usually small and the required hand calculations
are relatively simple. In large systems, there are often large numbers of transitions that are omitted by HARP and
the cumulative effect can be significant. These systems are also more difficult to analyze by hand calculation than a
small system.
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solvethe FEHMin isolationto determinetheexit probabilitiesandthenreplacethedistributionsof
the sojourntimesof the FEHM with instantaneousjumps. The FORM modelis thenaugmented
with coverageparametersfi'om the FEHM cMculations.For example,the modelof Figure 2 is
converted into the form shown in Figure 16. This "instantaneous jump" model is a pure Markov
+ 5))
+
Figure 16: HARP Instantaneous Jump Model Of a Degradable Quad
model that is solved using a differential equations g package.
It should be noted that the instantaneous jump procedure uses a conservative approximation,
which may mask the non-conservative trimming error. For example, if the exact answer to a Markov
model is A, the trimming error is et, and the instantaneous-jump error is ej, then the computed
answer would be A - et + ej. If the magnitude of ej is greater than et, then the computed error
would still be conservative. We do not know in practice under which conditions ej will exceed et
and hence when a user of HARP will actually see non-conservative answers. Although the potential
for a non-conservative answer exists, the experimental studies have not been performed on HARP
V7.0 to defineate the regions where this occurs. Therefore it is up to the user of HARP to make
sure that the et trimming error is not too large. It should be noted that the computations in the
previous section were not made on the instantaneous jump model that HARP uses to make its final
calculations.
6 Conclusion
The HARP manual warns the user that the HARP program can drop failure modes for certain
systems. This note provides an explanation of how this "state trimming" occurs. An error bound
for this trimming has been developed [3, 2], but is not currently implemented in the HARP program.
It is recommended that this bound be manually cMculated to insure that the trimming is not
excessive.
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